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SUMMARY TABLE 
 2020 2021 2022 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)       
Private Consumer Expenditure -9.0 6.7 10.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 9.8 5.0 3.0 
Investment -32.3 5.8 6.8 
Exports 6.2 7.0 7.0 
Imports -11.3 9.3 9.0 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 3.4 4.4 5.2 
Gross National Product (GNP) 0.6 3.6 4.9 
        
Labour Market       
Employment Levels (‘000) 1,976 2,033 2,303 
Unemployment Levels (‘000) 450 407 181 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 18.7 16.7 7.3 
        
Public Finances       
General Government Balance (€bn) -19.7 -18.5 -7.8 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -5.4 -4.7 -1.9 
 
Note:  The employment level for 2020 is based on the COVID-adjusted level of employment at the end of each quarter published by the 
CSO along with the quarterly LFS. As a result it represents a lower bound estimate for employment in 2020. The unemployment 
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The Irish Economy – Overview 
 
• December 2020 saw a significant increase in the level of COVID-19 
infections prompting the Irish authorities to re-impose Level 5 public 
health restrictions on economic and social life from the end of 2020. These 
measures are set to remain in place until 5 April 2021 at the earliest. 
• While the Winter 2020 Commentary did anticipate a further series of 
restrictions in 2021, it expected a shorter duration than now appears likely. 
• Consequently, while we still expect to see the Irish economy grow in 2021, 
we have moderated our forecast for the present year when compared with 
the last Commentary. 
• We now assume that the Level 5 lockdown that commenced on 
30 December 2020 will last until at least 5 April 2021 and that there will be 
a gradual easing of restrictions thereafter.  
• We assume that the vaccination programme will facilitate the broad 
relaxation of public health restrictions in the second half of 2021 and that 
there will not be another Level 5 lockdown this year. 
• Given these assumptions, we now expect Irish GDP to increase by 4.4 per 
cent in the present year. Unemployment is expected to peak at 25 per cent 
in Q1 2021 before falling to just over 10 per cent by the end of the year. 
• We also outline our first set of forecasts for 2022; we expect the economy 
to continue to recover next year with output set to increase by 5.2 per cent. 
Unemployment is set to fall further and will average just over 7 per cent 
for the year. However, we do not expect to see the unemployment rate fall 
back to pre-COVID rates until late 2023 at the earliest. 
• The relatively elevated rates of unemployment for the present year will 
place the public finances under further strain. We now expect a deficit of 
just under €19 billion in 2021 or 4.7 per cent of GDP. 
• In the public finances section of the Commentary we examine the 
implications of an alternative measure of debt sustainability; the ratio of 
real interest payments-to-GDP. The results based on this measure suggest 
the Exchequer has additional room for fiscal expansion over and above that 
suggested by the traditional debt-to-GDP metric. 
• The Commentary contains a Box by FitzGerald which updates an earlier 
paper outlining a new variable for measuring Irish economic activity. In 
contrast to existing measures, this new measure suggests the Irish 
economy grew by 5 per cent on average between 2013 and 2019. 
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• A Research Note to the Commentary by McQuinn re-examines the 
interrelationship between mortgage credit and house prices in the Irish 
market. The Note presents some evidence to suggest that the present 
macroprudential measures are successful in limiting the degree of 
mortgage credit growth and ultimately house price increases. 
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• For 2021 we assume that the vaccination programme will facilitate the broad 
relaxation of public health restrictions in the second half of 2021 and that there 
will not be another Level 5 lockdown this year.  
• GDP is set to increase by 4.4 per cent in the present year and 5.2 per cent in 
2022. 
• An alternative estimate to GDP growth suggests the Irish economy grew by 
5 per cent on average per annum between 2013 and 2019. 
 
In our previous Commentary we had assumed that a six-week Level 5 lockdown 
would occur during the first half of 2021. However, we now assume that the Level 5 
lockdown which commenced on 30 December 2020 will last until at least 5 April 
2021 and that there will be a gradual easing of restrictions thereafter. We assume 
that the vaccination programme will facilitate the broad relaxation of public health 
restrictions in the second half of 2021 and that there will not be another Level 5 
lockdown this year.  
 
The performance of the Irish economy in achieving positive growth in 2020 was 
quite remarkable. Most of this performance can be attributed to certain 
multinational intensive components of the export sector. Figure 1 compares the 
performance of a number of select advanced economies in 2020. Ireland, alone, 
experienced growth in GDP. 
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FIGURE 1  GDP GROWTH (%) 2020 
 
 
Source:  QEC calculations and EU Commission. 
 
While the duration of the Level 5 restrictions is longer than had been expected in 
the Winter Commentary, we still expect a strong recovery in the domestic economy 
over the course of the year. As economic conditions improve through the year, 
consumption is expected to increase by 6.7 per cent while investment is forecast 
to increase by 5.8 per cent. The export sector is also likely to continue to perform 
strongly in 2021. However, the reliance on specific sectors such as pharmaceuticals 
and computer services means export growth is quite dependent on sector specific 
idiosyncratic performance. We are expecting output growth of 4.4 per cent for the 
current year. 
 
In 2022, the Irish economy is expected to continue to grow strongly in the 
aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. As consumer confidence improves, some of 
the increased savings which have accumulated over the past year are likely to be 
spent and contribute to the recovery. The pace of growth is likely to increase next 
year as vaccines become more widely distributed on an international basis. 
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TABLE 1  SUMMARY OF GROWTH FORECASTS (%) FOR 2021 AND 2022 
 2020 2021 2022 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)       
Private Consumer Expenditure -9.0 6.7 10.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 9.8 5.0 3.0 
Investment -32.3 5.8 6.8 
Exports 6.2 7.0 7.0 
Imports -11.3 9.3 9.0 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 3.4 4.4 5.2 
Gross National Product (GNP) 0.6 3.6 4.9 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
In Box A the new economic output indicator outlined in FitzGerald (2020)1 is 
updated with the latest set of Institutional Sector Accounts for Ireland, which were 
published in October 2020. The latest estimates of growth based on this approach 
suggest the Irish economy grew, on average, by 5 per cent per annum between 
2013 and 2019. 
 
BOX A ECONOMIC GROWTH BETWEEN 2013 AND 2019 
Introduction 
Over the last decade the traditional national accounting data for the Irish economy have 
proved increasingly difficult to understand. While they conform to the standard approach 
to national accounting followed by all EU countries, the globalisation of the Irish economy 
means that they no longer provide all the information that policymakers need. 
 
To deal with these problems the CSO has provided a range of additional data, as 
recommended by the Economic Statistics Review Group in 2017. Initially a new measure, 
adjusted Gross National Income, GNI*, was published by the CSO which dealt with some 
of the problems with traditional GNI and GDP. In addition, a key set of new data was 
published by the CSO in their Institutional Sector Accounts in November 2019. However, 
in their raw form these data are difficult to interpret and, in a Special Article to the Autumn 
2020 QEC, FitzGerald showed how these data, when appropriately analysed, provide 
valuable insights into the growth of national income in recent years and which industrial 
sectors are contributing most to that growth. 
 
The latest version of the Institutional Sector Accounts for Ireland, covering the years to 
2019, were published in October 2020. These accounts contain new data for 2019 together 
with revised data for earlier years. This Box updates the earlier Article to take account of 





1  FitzGerald J. (2020). ‘Understanding recent trends in the Irish economy’, Special Article, Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, Autumn. 
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The Institutional Sector Accounts provide data for both the financial sector and the 
Non-Financial Corporations sector, broken down by foreign-owned multinationals (MNEs) 
and domestic firms. In addition, the CSO has published data on Gross Value Added (GVA), 
compensation of employees (COE) and Gross Operating Surplus (GOS) for each industrial 
sector, cross-classified by institutional sector. These data are now available for the period 
2013 to 2019. 
 
The second section of this Box looks at what these data tell us about growth in the 
economy and how this information compares with the key aggregates in National Income 
and Expenditure, 2019. The third section then looks at the contributions of the different 
industrial sectors of the economy to growth. 
Economic Growth 
As outlined in the Special Article in the Autumn 2020 QEC, GDP, the traditional measure of 
national output and income, is no longer a good measure of the economic welfare of those 
living in Ireland. 
 
As set out in the Article, the best available measure of real activity in Ireland is provided 
by Net National Product (NNP). A key difference between the NNP measure and adjusted 
Gross National Income, GNI*, is that NNP adjusts for all depreciation, whereas GNI* only 
adjusts for depreciation on foreign-owned intellectual property, R&D service imports and 
leased aircraft. In addition, by focusing on NNP it is possible to decompose output by 
industrial sector and by ownership, allowing one to clearly identify where the growth in 
the economy, that adds to the welfare of Irish residents, is coming from. This is not possible 
with GNI*.  
 
TABLE A.1 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE, CONSTANT PRICES (%) 
              Average Annual 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2013-2019 
NNP after profit repatriations 6.8 1.7 5.6 4.8 5.6 3.9 4.7 
NNP adjusted for redomiciled PLCs 7.9 3.5 5.6 2.2 7.2 3.9 5.0 
NNP 7.8 1.4 6.3 1.2 7.3 3.2 4.5 
GNI* from NIE 8.8 -0.3 5.9 4.6 6.8 1.7 4.6 
GNI from NIE 8.7 13.7 9.7 5.1 6.5 6.5 8.7 
GDP from NIE 8.6 25.2 3.7 8.1 8.2 8.2 10.5 
Modified Total Domestic Demand 4.1 4.5 5.8 3.5 4.3 3.3 4.4 
Employment 2.6 3.4 3.6 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.1 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using CSO data. 
 
Table A.1 shows the annual growth rate for the economy using a number of different 
measures of economic welfare. The standard metric used internationally is GDP. However 
for Ireland, as discussed above, it has proved a very poor measure in recent years. As 
argued in the Autumn 2020 QEC Special Article, NNP adjusted for redomiciled PLCs is 
probably the best measure of growth.  
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Adjusted NNP grew by just under 4 per cent in 2019. With a growth in employment in that 
year of just over 3 per cent, that suggests a growth in productivity of slightly less than 1 per 
cent. Using this measure, over the six years from 2013 to 2019 the economy grew by 
around 5 per cent a year with a growth in productivity of around 2 per cent a year. The 
data suggest some volatility in the growth in output over the six years, with growth in 2017 
being 2.2 per cent and that in 2018 of 7.2 per cent. By contrast the employment figures 
show very little volatility in growth around the average of 3.1 per cent. 
 
The alternative best measure of the growth of the economy is the CSO aggregate of 
adjusted Gross National Income, GNI*. The average growth in this aggregate over the six 
years is 4.6 per cent, slightly lower than that for adjusted NNP. However, adjusted GNI* 
shows much greater volatility than adjusted NNP, with growth in GNI* implausibly being 
slightly negative in 2015, the year when GDP grew by over 25 per cent and employment 
grew by 3.4 per cent. 
 
Modified Domestic Demand grew by an average of 4.4 per cent a year, slightly less than 
average growth in Adjusted NNP of 5 per cent. The higher growth in NNP indicates a 
moderate additional contribution to growth from the external sector over the period. Also, 
the growth in Modified Domestic Demand shows very little volatility over the six years, 
indicating that the volatility in the growth in adjusted NNP arose from economic relations 
with the outside world. 
Contribution to Growth 
Table A.2 shows the average contribution to adjusted NNP from each industrial sector over 
the period 2013 to 2019. Public administration accounted for a fifth of the output of the 
economy, and the distribution, transport and hospitality sector accounted for slightly less 
at 19 per cent of output. Manufacturing accounted for 14 per cent of output, the 
professional and administration sector for 11 per cent, the financial sector and real estate 
for 9 per cent each and IT for 7 per cent. 
 
For the economy as a whole, the foreign MNE sector accounted for 22 per cent of national 
output and income, with the domestic sector accounting for the other 78 per cent. Within 
manufacturing and the IT sector, foreign MNEs accounted for just over half of the 
contribution to national income and output. While the figures for manufacturing are not a 
surprise, for the IT sector the fact that almost half of the contribution to national income 
came from domestic firms does stand out. While foreign MNE firms, such as Facebook and 
Microsoft have a high profile, the domestic firms, which are also making an important 
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TABLE A.2 AVERAGE SHARE OF NNP BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, CURRENT PRICES, 2013-2019 (%) 
 Total Foreign MNEs Domestic 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1.4 0.0 1.4 
Manufacturing 14.1 7.3 6.7 
Electricity, gas, and water 1.7 0.1 1.6 
Construction 4.4 0.2 4.2 
Distribution, transport, hospitality 18.9 3.7 15.2 
Information and communication 7.1 3.6 3.5 
Financial and insurance activities 8.9 3.4 5.5 
Real estate activities 9.3 0.1 9.2 
Professional, admin etc. 10.9 2.5 8.4 
Public Admin, Education and Health 20.5 0.1 20.4 
Arts, entertainment and other etc. 2.5 0.1 2.4 
Factor Income - Profit repatriations 46.7 46.7 0.0 
NNP after profit repatriations 99.6 21.2 78.4 
Factor Income - other, excluding Redomiciled PLCs -0.4 -1.1 0.7 
NNP adjusted for redomiciled PLCs 100.0 22.2 77.7 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using CSO data. 
 
TABLE A.3 AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, CONSTANT PRICES,  
2013-2019 (%) 
  All Sectors 
Foreign 
MNEs Domestic 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 12.2 1.2 12.5 
Manufacturing 5.0 5.8 4.1 
Electricity, gas, and water -4.0 -0.7 -4.1 
Construction 10.3 -1.0 11.0 
Distribution, transport, hospitality 4.5 4.8 4.4 
Information and communication 11.3 9.9 12.9 
Financial and insurance activities 1.8 0.4 2.8 
Real estate activities 2.9 -5.1 3.0 
Professional, admin and support services 8.2 7.4 8.4 
Public Admin, Education and Health 2.4 2.3 2.4 
Arts, entertainment and other services 5.6 -1.2 5.7 
NNP after profit repatriations 4.7 5.3 4.6 
NNP adjusted for redomiciled PLCs 5.0 4.8 5.1 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using CSO data. 
 
Table A.3 shows the average growth rate over the period 2013 to 2019. The MNE sector 
grew by 4.8 per cent a year while the domestic sector grew by slightly more at 5.1 per cent. 
This indicates that the shares of the economy accounted for by the MNE and the domestic 
sectors changed little over the period. 
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The rapidly growing sectors were construction, recovering from a very low base in 2013, 
IT, professional and administration, and agriculture. The arts and entertainment sector 
also grew quite rapidly at 5.6 per cent a year. However, that sector has since been 
decimated in 2020 due to the current crisis. Manufacturing, an important sector, grew by 
around 5 per cent a year, keeping pace with the overall growth in the economy. The public 
administration sector grew at just under 3 per cent a year, somewhat more slowly than 
the economy as a whole. 
 
References 
FitzGerald J. (2020). ‘Understanding recent trends in the Irish economy’, Special Article, 
Quarterly Economic Commentary. Economic and Social Research Institute, Autumn. 
 




• Consumption expenditure dropped by 9 per cent in 2020. 
• Ireland had a higher increase in the savings rate in 2020 than other countries. 
The unwinding of these excess savings may support economic recovery. 
• The consumption forecast for 2021 is lower than previously expected due to 
ongoing restrictions, but strong growth is forecast for the second half of the 
year. 
 
Household sector consumption  
The fall in consumer expenditure in 2020 was approximately 9 per cent relative to 
2019 (CSO, 2021). The introduction of public health measures in March 2020 
coincided with the largest decline in household spending on a quarterly basis on 
record. While a recovery occurred during the summer period as the economy was 
re-opened, the second and third waves of COVID-19 infections in the last quarter 
of 2020 led to a further setback in consumer spending. Figure 2 presents the trend 
in consumption in Ireland to end-2020. The pronounced drop and recovery in 
spending is clearly evident.  
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FIGURE 2  QUARTERLY PERSONAL CONSUMPTION ON GOODS AND SERVICES – CONSTANT 
MARKET PRICES AND SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED – GROWTH RATES 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
The scale of the fall in consumption in Ireland in 2020 is in the mid-range 
experienced by other European economies. The largest drops in consumer 
expenditure were seen in Greece, Cyprus, Slovenia, Italy and Portugal. It is likely 
that a range of factors affected the overall fall in consumption, but of particular 
importance are the policy supports to protect household incomes combined with 
the degree of severity, and duration, of public health restrictions. Also important 
is the level of disease prevalence which has been shown to have a considerable 
impact on household behaviour through precautionary channels (Goolsbee and 
Syverson, 2021). Previous research (O’Toole, 2020) indicated that public health 
restrictions in the first part of the year were strict in Ireland relative to other 
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FIGURE 3  YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGE IN FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE FOR SELECTED 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIES (2019-2020) 
  
 
Source:  ESRI Analysis of Eurostat data. Series: Final consumption expenditure of households, chain linked volumes (2015).  
Note: Figures may differ between these data and the CSO National Accounts Consumption Figure reported elsewhere due to 
definitional differences. The selection of this indicator was undertaken to ensure a consistent comparison across countries with 
the same variable from Eurostat.  
 
While household spending dropped dramatically since the onset of the pandemic, 
a notable feature in the data is that household incomes appear to have been 
affected to a lesser extent (on aggregate). This has led to a major increase in the 
savings ratio to over 35 per cent in Q2 2020. While data for the third quarter 
indicate a fall-back in the share of savings from the Q2 high, the ratio still remains 
well above the pre-COVID-19 average. Figure 4 documents the change in the gross 
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FIGURE 4  EVOLUTION OF THE GROSS SAVINGS RATIO IN IRELAND 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
Note: Savings rate is calculated as the difference between gross disposable income and final consumption expenditure from the 
institutional accounts scaled by gross disposable income.  
 
The adjustment of the savings ratio is important for economic recovery; if 
households run down excess savings balances when their consumption possibilities 
are widened, this could provide a natural demand stimulus without policy 
intervention. Recent research by FitzGerald (2020) notes the potential benefit of 
these savings in providing a stimulus to the domestic economy when public health 
restrictions are lifted. Figure 5 also shows that the savings ratio increased in Ireland 
to a larger extent than other European countries. While a similar savings rate is 
observed before the pandemic when comparing Ireland to the EU27, the increase 
in Q2 and Q3 of 2020 were substantially higher. This may suggest that Ireland has 
more built up savings to boost the post COVID-19 recovery relative to other 
countries. As consumption adjusted in a similar manner to other countries, it also 
indicates that incomes have held up better in Ireland. Some possible explanations 
for Ireland’s relatively strong record of sustaining incomes include the extensive 
income supports and the two-tier nature of the Irish economy which has left many 
households unaffected in earnings terms (O’Toole, 2020).  
 
There are however a number of uncertainties around the degree to which the 
evident increase in savings will result in greater consumption. Firstly, a large 
portion of any consumption increase is likely to leak out of the economy in higher 
imports. Second, it matters where the change in the savings rate is taking place 
across the income distribution: for example, if the savings increase accrues to 
higher income households, these households may have a lower overall propensity 
to consume and thus the increase in consumption is more muted. Thirdly, if the 
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precautionary savings as a buffer. Finally, some of the higher savings may be used 
to purchase assets such as housing rather than consumption goods.  
 
FIGURE 5  EVOLUTION OF THE GROSS SAVINGS RATIO IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat data on gross savings ratio. Countries included in comparison are: Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, 
Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, UK.  
 
The third wave of COVID-19 infections which occurred at the end of 2020 has led 
to a more extreme set of public health measures being required than we 
anticipated in the previous Commentary. The duration and breadth of restrictions 
are likely to reduce expenditure, and an early indicator of this can be seen in the 
retail sales data. Figure 6 presents an index of selected main retail sales aggregates 
benchmarked at August 2020 (100) to provide an understanding of how the second 
half of 2020 has progressed relative to the summer rebound. The retail sales of 
food, as it remains relatively constant, provides a good benchmark in order to 
explore the time varying impact of public health restrictions and consumer 
spending changes for the other indicators. We can see the Level 5 restrictions in 
November and in early 2021 have led to a marked decline in retail sales.2 More 




2  The retail sales index is based on an enterprise survey and, in sectors with closures due to COVID-19 health restrictions, 
the results may be more volatile over time due to reporting. See CSO discussion note: 
https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/in/rsi/informationnoteontheimplicationsofcovid-
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suggest that the drop in spending in the early months of 2021 is as large, if not 
larger, than the first wave in April 2020 in value terms.  
 
FIGURE 6  DEVELOPMENTS IN RETAIL SALES INDEX (ADJUSTED TO 100 IN AUGUST 2020) 
 
 
Source:  ESRI Analysis of CSO data. This sets the retail sales index (volumes) at 100 in August 2020.  
 
To provide further real-time insight, we explore recent trends in consumer 
sentiment. Figure 7 provides trends in consumer sentiment for Ireland, the UK and 
the EU27 for the period July 2019 – February 2021. The index takes the value 100 
in January 2020. The onset of the pandemic was associated with a rapid and 
extensive drop in consumer confidence as households were subject to the 
restrictions and the associated economic shocks. The re-introduction of lockdown 
restrictions in January 2021 led to a dip in consumer sentiment. However, a 
rebound did occur in February 2021. Consumer sentiment in Ireland remains above 
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FIGURE 7 CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDICATORS – IRELAND, UK AND REST OF EU27 (JANUARY 
2020 = 100) 
 
 
Sources:  European Commission data and QEC calculation.  
Note:  The positive/negative balances from the EU COF series are transformed by adding 100. We then set the base to 100 in January 
2020 with growth relative to this point i.e. ((Yt/YJan2010) -1)*100.  
 
Consumption forecasts 
In terms of our outlook for consumption for 2021, we expect a considerably lower 
overall level of spending than our previous Commentary outlined due to the longer 
duration of strict public health measures in the first half of the year. However, we 
still expect a strong rebound in the second half of the year as the vaccination 
coverage increases and public health measures are somewhat eased. We now 
expect consumption to increase by 6.7 per cent in 2021 relative to our previous 
forecast of 11.7 per cent. For 2022, we expect a strong recovery to continue with 
consumption growth of 10.0 per cent now expected.  
 
Developments in consumer prices 
Since the onset of the pandemic there has been a drop in consumer prices. The 
year-on-year change in the Consumer Price Index is down -0.3 per cent on average 
for 2020. Figure 8 displays the trend in the overall (all items) CPI inflation rate and 
the rate of price changes for the main subcomponents.3 It is clear a marked 
downward trend in inflation coincided with the pandemic. The inflation rate 




3  It must be noted there are difficulties with measuring price changes where there are low activity levels in sectors 
severely hit by public health measures. Please see CSO note for more details: 
 https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/in/cpi/informationnoteonimplicationsofcovid-
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prices were transport prices, energy costs, food, housing and utilities. Deflationary 
pressures have eased somewhat in the later months of 2020 and into 2021.  
 
FIGURE 8 CONSUMER PRICE INFLATION – CONTRIBUTION TO CHANGE IN CPI BY COMPONENT 
– YEAR-ON-YEAR % CHANGE 
 
 
Source:  CSO and QEC calculations.  
Note: Please note the components in this chart do not sum to one as categories with cross-over items (such as energy) have been 
included for display purposes.  
 
Given the developments in prices, our projection for consumer price inflation for 
2021 is 0.7 per cent and 1.2 per cent for 2022. Given the unique nature of the 
pandemic related economic shock (with characteristics such as a constrained 
consumption basket, extensive fiscal support and accommodative monetary 
policy), there are some potential risks that inflationary pressures may build up in 

































• Exports grew by 6.2 per cent in 2020 compared to 2019.  
• The main drivers of export growth have been medicinal and pharmaceutical 
goods and ICT which have grown strongly throughout the pandemic.  
• Compared to 2019, imports declined by 11.3 per cent. This was linked to a 
reduction in imports of intellectual property products (IPP).  
• Irish net exports were €108.96 billion in 2020. 
 
The robust performance of the Irish traded sector was the reason why Irish GDP 
performed so well relative to other countries in 2020. Despite the pandemic’s 
negative impact on the economies of many of our trading partners last year, Irish 
exports grew by 6.2 per cent in 2020 relative to 2019. Imports on the other hand 
declined by 11.3 per cent between 2019 and 2020. The joint impact of these 
changes was to increase Irish net exports to €108.96 billion in 2020, an increase of 
€73.4 billion compared to 2019.  
 
Exports of both goods and services performed well in the final quarter of 2020. 
Figure 9 shows the annual growth in seasonally-adjusted Irish exports by quarter. 
In Q4 2020 exports increased by 10.4 per cent annually. This was driven by the 
strong growth in both services and goods exports with the former increasing by 
6.5 per cent and the latter increasing by 14.0 per cent compared to Q4 2019.  
 
FIGURE 9  SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED EXPORTS: YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH (VOLUME, %) 
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O’Toole (2020) highlighted that one of the primary reasons for the robustness of 
Irish exports in early 2020 was the strong performance of medicinal and 
pharmaceutical products. Figure 10 shows that while exports of this commodity 
group were down slightly compared to the previous quarter (-5.2 per cent), they 
registered significant annual growth (27.4 per cent) in Q4 2020. While the strong 
growth of this commodity sector is undoubtedly a positive for the Irish economy, 
the fact that this sector is dominated by a small number of multinational 
corporations highlights the vulnerability of the Irish economy to the individual 
performance of a relatively small number of companies. It is also important to note 
that exports of these products may be elevated due to the nature of the pandemic, 
and once the global health emergency passes it is possible that there will be a 
reduction in such exports. Between Q3 and Q4 the value of organic chemicals 
exports declined by 18.4 per cent while the value of exported miscellaneous 
manufactured goods increased by 8 per cent. Although the value of exports of 
machinery and transport equipment declined by only 1 per cent compared to 
Q3 2020, it has declined by 26.8 per cent compared to Q4 2019.  
 
FIGURE 10 GOODS EXPORTS BY COMMODITY GROUP (VALUE, € MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Service exports performed well over the final quarter of 2020; the largest 
component of service exports recorded strong quarterly and annual growth. 
Computer services, which accounted for 57 per cent of the value of total service 
exports in Q4 2020, grew by 29.7 per cent in Q4 compared to Q3, and 19.8 per cent 
compared to the same period the previous year. As shown in Figure 11 the 
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the computer services sector. Business services also account for a significant 
proportion of Irish service exports and it also experienced strong growth in 
Q4 2020. The value of exports in this area increased by 52.4 per cent relative to 
Q3 2020 and by 11.4 per cent relative to Q4 2019. Financial services, insurance and 
royalties/licenses each increased annually by 13.1, 11.5 and 33.3 per cent 
respectively.  
 
FIGURE 11  SERVICE EXPORTS BY COMPONENT (VALUE, € MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Figure 12 shows annual import growth remained negative in Q4 2020 as imports 
of both goods and services declined over the period. Compared to Q4 2019, 
imports were down by 20.9 per cent, with goods imports declining 2.3 per cent and 
services declining by 26.6 per cent. The CSO has suggested that the decline in 
imports in 2020 overall is driven to a considerable extent by a fall in IPP investment 





4  For more information see: https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-
na/quarterlynationalaccountsquarter42020/internationaltrade.   
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FIGURE 12  SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED IMPORTS: YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH (VOLUME, %) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Figure 13 shows goods imports by main use over the last five years. In 2020 the 
majority of goods imports fell under the category of materials for production 
(goods that are imported for use in the production process of Irish firms). Imports 
for this use increased by 6.3 per cent in 2020 compared to 2019, and were 36.4 per 
cent higher in 2020 when compared with the 2015 level. Despite the declines in 
consumption over 2020, imports of consumption goods in 2020 were 2.5 per cent 
higher than they were in 2019 and 11.8 per cent higher than they were in 2015. 
Although it was 6.1 per cent higher in 2020 than 2015, there was a large decline 
(31.5 per cent) in the import of producer capital goods between 2019 and 2020. 
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FIGURE 13  GOODS IMPORTS BY MAIN USE (VALUE, € MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Figure 14 shows the share of Irish goods imports by country of origin and the share 
of Irish exports by destination for 2020. The United States was the origin of 21 per 
cent of Irish goods imports in 2020 and it was the destination for 31 per cent of 
goods exports. While 21 per cent of goods imports came from Great Britain5 (GB) 
in 2020, only 8 per cent of goods exports in 2020 went to GB. France and Germany 
were among our largest trading partners for both goods imports and exports in 
2020. Approximately 7 per cent of both goods exports and imports went to or came 
from China in 2020. As noted in Euroframe (2021), China has experienced a very 
strong recovery and has not had a second major wave of infections. Euroframe 
(2021) expects UK GDP will grow by 3.4 per cent 2021 and that Euro Area GDP will 
grow by 4.9 per cent in 2021 and 3.1 per cent in 2022.6 Also, the economic stimulus 
plan of the new Biden administration enacted by the US house of representatives 





5  Great Britain refers to the UK excluding Northern Ireland. 
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FIGURE 14  SHARE OF IRISH GOODS IMPORTS (LHS) AND EXPORTS (RHS) BY COUNTY 2020  
  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Figure 15 shows the value of Irish trade with the UK in Q4 2020. In the final quarter 
of 2020, the value of goods imports from the UK was greater than exports resulting 
in a trade deficit of €1.6 billion. Exports of services to the UK were greater than 
imports resulting in a surplus of €3.9 billion. Overall, Irish exports to the UK were 
greater than imports resulting in a trade surplus of €2.3 billion. 
 
The UK officially left the EU in January 2020 and entered the transition period. At 
11pm on 31 December 2020 the transition period ended, and the UK now trades 
with EU on terms agreed in the trade deal signed on 30 December 2020. However, 
not all aspects of the trade deal are fully in force at present and the pathway of 
trade between the UK and Ireland throughout 2021 and beyond will likely be 
affected by the manner and timing of the escalation of the trade deal’s 
implementation. While there is still a significant degree of uncertainty around this, 
stricter trade rules will likely have a negative impact on trade. The end of the 
transition period brought with it the imposition of new barriers, such as additional 
paperwork and increased Customs checks, on trade between the EU and the UK. 
Data from January 2021 suggest that UK goods exports to the EU fell by 40.7 per 
cent while UK goods imports from the EU fell by 28.8 per cent. The reduction in UK 
goods imports from the EU in January 2021 was driven by a reduction in the 
importation of goods such as cars and medical and pharmaceutical products 
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FIGURE 15  TRADE WITH THE UK IN Q4 2020 (VALUE, € MILLION)  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
As the vaccine is rolled out in many countries this year and the economies of 
Ireland’s largest trading partners are expected to record positive growth, Irish 
exports should continue to grow positively. As a result, export growth for 2021 and 
2022 is forecast at 7.0 per cent. As exports, investment and consumption all pick 
up next year, imports are also forecast to increase by 9.3 per cent for 2021 while 


















• Investment fell by 32.3 per cent in 2020 compared to 2019 and this was driven 
by the significant yearly drops in machinery and equipment, and building and 
construction activity. 
• Capital investment influenced by Intellectual property products (IPP) declined 
by €49 billion in 2020. 
• Modified investment, which is adjusted to avoid the distortions caused by 
investment in intellectual property and aircraft related to leasing, declined by 
3.4 per cent annually in Q4. 
• We expect approximately 15,000 housing completions in 2021 and 16,000 in 
2022. 
• Investment forecast to grow by 5.8 per cent in 2021 and by 6.8 per cent in 2022. 
 
 
The negative impact of COVID-19 on investment was visible during Q4 2020, as 
overall Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) declined by 62 per cent compared to 
the same period the previous year. This marked the third consecutive quarter 
where investment growth remained in negative territory, following the 73 per cent 
and 13 per cent annual declines recorded in Q2 and Q3 2020, respectively. Overall, 
for 2020 as a whole, GFCF declined by 32.3 per cent. This decline was largely driven 
by the significant yearly drops in machinery and equipment (-25.2 per cent), and 
building and construction activity (-9.1 per cent).  
 
However, the well documented distortions in the headline investment figures 
caused by the operations of large multinational firms (see FitzGerald, 2018; 2020) 
are the source of increased volatility in the quarterly investment series and mask 
the developments in the underlying domestic investment behaviour. 2020 again 
saw evidence of this with the large decrease in headline investment being mainly 
attributable to the decline of €49 billion in capital investment. This is associated 
with movements in intellectual property products (IPP). 
 
In order to obtain a better indication of domestic investment activity, the CSO has 
developed the Modified Domestic GFCF series, which excludes investment in 
intellectual property and aircraft related to leasing, thus removing a significant 
element of the distortionary impact. The developments in domestic investment 
activity are depicted in Figure 16. Following the sharp decrease of 24 per cent in 
the modified investment series during Q2 2020 (compared to the same quarter of 
the previous year), the decline in investment activity reduced during the second 
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half of the year. In particular during Q3 and Q4 when investment declined by 
4.7 and 3.4 per cent, respectively. Although the data for most of 
the subcomponents of investment were not released for this time period, 
the data available for building and construction activity show a significant pickup, 
especially in Q4 with a 2.2 per cent annual increase. 
FIGURE 16 MODIFIED GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
Note:  SA stands for seasonally-adjusted. 
To gain insight into how business confidence has been impacted by the pandemic, 
we draw on the European Commission’s Economic Sentiment Indicator (a 
composite index of five separate indicators related to industry, services, retail, 
consumers and construction) and the Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) for both 
the manufacturing and services sectors, presented in Figures 17 and 18, 
respectively. As is evident from both Figures, the imposition of the first lockdown 
during March and April 2020 led to a steep decline in all indicators, with the 
services sector index exhibiting the largest drop. Following the gradual easing of 
the restrictions, both economic sentiment and the PMI started increasing; however 
only the manufacturing PMI managed not only to return to, but surpassed, its 
pre-pandemic level. 
The imposition of the new wave of restrictions in September led to a temporary 
deterioration in economic sentiment, which recovered during the last two months 
of 2020. In terms of the PMI, the restrictive measures had a far more negative 
impact in the services sector, while the index of manufacturing shows that the 
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Overall, the end of the year saw significantly improved expectations for both the 
manufacturing and the services sectors, with the indexes in both sectors recording 
a strong increase. However, given the apparent strong correlation between the 
timing of the public health measures and the two indexes, it is expected that both 
economic sentiment and the PMI (especially that of services) will deteriorate in the 
first quarter of 2021. 
 
FIGURE 17 ECONOMIC SENTIMENT INDICATOR 
 
 
Source:  European Commission.  
 
FIGURE 18 PURCHASING MANAGERS INDEX 
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Housing completions 
In Q4 2020 there was a significant rise in the number of new housing completions, 
with 7,400 new residential completions recorded, marking an increase of almost 
16 per cent compared to Q4 2019. This led to a total of 20,676 new dwelling 
completions for 2020, only 1.9 per cent down compared to the 21,087 completions 
of 2019. As such, it seems that the decision taken in October 2020 to allow work in 
construction sites to continue contributed to the recovery from the impact of 
COVID-19 on completions experienced in Q2 2020. 
 
However, the new guidelines for the Level 5 lockdown restrictions introduced in 
early January 2021, under which most construction work is no longer deemed 
essential, are likely to have an adverse effect on overall housing supply. If 
construction work starts again in April 2021, this would imply that for Q1 2021 
there will be a considerable reduction in construction output; as a comparison 
point, the decrease in Q2 2020, when construction work was halted due to the first 
wave of public health restrictions, was 32.6 per cent.  
 
Additionally, the prevailing environment of heightened uncertainty is likely to lead 
to a further reduction in investment in new dwellings, especially in the short-run. 
This decline in supply may further exacerbate the gap with structural demand, an 
issue analysed in Allen-Coghlan et al. (2020).8 Under these conditions, we forecast 
that a total of 15,000 new dwelling completions will be recorded in 2021.  
 
FIGURE 19  HOUSING COMPLETIONS 
 
 





8  Allen-Coghlan, M., K. McQuinn and C. O’Toole (2020). ‘Assessing the impacts of COVID-19 on the Irish property market: 
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A first indication of the potential shortages in short-run housing supply is provided 
by the number of residential commencements. As can be gleaned from Figure 20, 
despite the mild increase in commencements toward the end of the year, the 
growth rate of commencements was negative, leading to almost 5,000 fewer 
commencements in 2020 compared to 2019.  
 
FIGURE 20 RESIDENTIAL COMMENCEMENTS 
 
 
Source:   Housing Agency.  
 
In light of the stricter lockdown restrictions that were put in place in early 2021 
and which are envisaged to remain in place until at least the beginning of April 
2021, investment activity is expected to be negatively affected during the first 
quarter of the year.  
 
Under the assumption that the vaccination programme will facilitate the broad 
relaxation of public health restrictions in the second half of 2021 and that there 
will not be another Level 5 lockdown this year, we forecast that investment will 
rebound significantly during the second half of the year. As a result, we expect 
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• The unemployment rate was 24.8 per cent in February 2021.  
• Approximately 468,850 people claimed the Pandemic Unemployment Payment 
(PUP) during the first week of March.  
• Employers received Employment Wage Subsidy Scheme (EWSS) payments for 
approximately 309,500 qualifying employees in February 2021.  
 
 
During the last 12 months, the COVID-19 pandemic has had a substantial impact 
on the Irish labour market. The significant fluctuations in the unemployment rate 
since early 2020 reflect the impact of the tightening and loosening of public health 
restrictions on businesses. The unemployment rate in February 2020 was 4.9 per 
cent while in February 2021 the COVID-adjusted unemployment rate was 24.8 per 
cent. The unemployment rate peaked at 30.5 per cent in April 2020. With the 
loosening of restrictions during the summer of 2020 came a decline in the 
unemployment rate between May and September 2020. In line with the 
re-introduction of more stringent public health restrictions, the unemployment 
rate increased from 15.7 per cent in September 2020 to 20.1 per cent in both 
October and November. While the unemployment rate fell slightly in December, it 
increased significantly in January 2021 to 25.1 per cent due to the public health 
restrictions in place. The average monthly unemployment rate for 2020 was 
approximately 18.7 per cent. Figure 21 shows the monthly unemployment rate 
from January 2016 to February 2021.  
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FIGURE 21 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY MONTH (%) 
 
 
Sources:  Seasonally-Adjusted Monthly Unemployment Rate Series and the COVID-19 Adjusted Monthly Unemployment Rate Series. 
Central Statistics Office.  
Note:  The COVID-19 Adjusted Monthly Unemployment rate is used from March 2020 onward, rather than the traditional Monthly 
Unemployment Rate.  
 
Looking at the number of individuals on the Live Register and in receipt of the 
Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP) on a weekly basis can provide further 
insight into the impact of the pandemic and the public health measures on the 
number of people without work. Three peaks are evident in the number of people 
on the PUP and these peaks coincide with the implementation of the strictest 
public health measures over the last 12 months. The first peak occurred in early 
May 2020 when the number of individuals in receipt of the PUP was just over 
605,000. Restrictions were eased and by the end of September 2020 there were 
just over 210,000 people in receipt of the PUP. An increase in case numbers 
prompted the return of more stringent public health restrictions in October 2020. 
This resulted in the second peak occurring in late November 2020 when over 
352,000 people were in receipt of the PUP. While the relaxation of restrictions in 
December 2020 brought a reduction in the number of PUP claimants, their 
re-introduction resulted in the third peak in the number of PUP claimants in early 
February 2021 when over 482,000 were in receipt of the PUP. Figure 22 shows the 
number of individuals in receipt of the PUP or on the Live Register by week from 
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FIGURE 22 NUMBER OF PEOPLE ON THE PUP AND LIVE REGISTER BY WEEK  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
The impact of the pandemic has not been evenly distributed across sectors or age 
groups with younger workers and public facing sectors faring worse than others. 
Of those in receipt of the PUP on 2 March 2021, 23.5 per cent were from the 
accommodation and food sector, 15.9 per cent were from the wholesale and retail 
trade/repair of motor vehicles sector, and 12.8 per cent were from the 
construction sector. These three sectors alone account for 52.2 per cent of those 
PUP recipients. In terms of age, 22.1 per cent of those in receipt of the PUP on 
2 March 2021 were aged between 25 and 34 with a further 23.7 per cent under 25.  
 
While the PUP was initially paid at a flat rate of €350, there are now four payment 
levels (€350, €300, €250 and €203) based on the amount previously earned. Of 
those in receipt of the PUP on 2 March 2021, 49.2 per cent received €350 while the 
remainder of recipients were relatively equally distributed across the other three 
payment levels. Of those who previously worked in the accommodation and food 
sector, 58.1 per cent received a PUP payment of less than €350 and this highlights 
the concentration of low paid workers within this sector. Table 2 shows the number 
of people in receipt of the PUP on 2 March 2021 broken down by age and payment 
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TABLE 2  BREAKDOWN OF PUP RECIPIENTS BY AGE AND PAYMENT LEVEL  
Age (Years) Number (‘000) Percentage  
 Payment (€) Number (‘000) Percentage  
<25 111.1 23.7  350 230.5 49.2 
25-34 103.6 22.1  300 79.3 16.9 
35-44 107.1 22.8  250 76.3 16.3 
45-54 83.9 17.9  203 82.8 17.7 
55+ 63.1 13.5  Total  468.8 100.0 
Total  468.8 100.0     
 
Source:  Payments Awarded for COVID-19 Pandemic Unemployment Payment and Enhanced Illness Benefit – Statistics. Published on 
2 March 2021 by Department of Social Protection.  
Note:  Figures refer to those in receipt of the PUP on 2 March 2021.  
 
The level and composition of those employed has also been affected. According to 
the Labour Force Survey there were an estimated 2,306,200 people at work in 
Q4 2020. This figure does not represent the full impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 
on the Irish labour market as it has been determined using strict classification 
criteria set by the ILO. To address this problem, a COVID-19 adjusted estimate of 
employment has been produced. The CSO estimates that 1,970,069 persons aged 
15 and over were in employment in December 2020 (the end of Q4).9 This figure 
represents a decline of 5.2 per cent when compared to the COVID-adjusted level 
of employment at the end of Q3 2020 (2,078,058 persons), and is 16.5 per cent 
lower than the level of employment in Q4 2019 (2,361,200 persons).  
 
Many of those still working are being supported by a wage subsidy scheme. These 
schemes allow employees, whose employers were negatively impacted by the 
pandemic, to be supported directly through their employer’s payroll system. The 
Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme (TWSS) ran from 26 March 2020 to 31 August 
2020. Approximately 365,000 employees were being directly supported by the 
scheme when it closed in August. The total cost to the Exchequer of operating the 
TWSS for its duration was just under €2.9 billion. While the TWSS was active, 
approximately 116,100 people regained employment and transitioned from the 
PUP to the TWSS. Approximately 22,000 individuals supported by the TWSS lost 
their jobs and transitioned from the scheme to the PUP. Approximately 260,900 
individuals moved from the TWSS to non-TWSS employment.10 This shows the 
significant role that wage subsidy schemes played in helping individuals retain/ 





9  For more information see: 
 https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/lfs/labourforcesurveylfsquarter42020.   
10  For more details see: https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/documents/research/statistical-overview-of-covid-19-
twss.pdf.  
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The Employment Wage Subsidy Scheme (EWSS) replaced the TWSS from 
1 September 2020 although the TWSS and the EWSS operated in parallel 
throughout July and August. The EWSS provides a subsidy to qualifying employers 
based on the number of eligible employees on their payroll. EWSS payments were 
made for 309,500 employees in February 2021. This is down from 352,500 
employees in January 2021. Figure 23 shows the number of individuals on the 
TWSS from February 2020 to August 2020 and the number of qualifying employees 
for whom the employer received an EWSS payment thereafter.  
 
FIGURE 23  NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES ON WAGE SUBSIDY SCHEMES BY MONTH 
 
 
Source:  Revenue Commissioners. 
Note:  EWSS back-payments for 30,700 employees were made with reference to the months of July and August combined but they are 
not included on this graph. 
 
Recent work by the CSO has highlighted the role that the COVID-19 income 
supports (PUP, TWSS and EWSS) have played in supporting incomes during 2020.11 
Their work compares the actual changes in earnings/incomes (employment 
earnings plus selected COVID-19 income supports) with a counterfactual scenario 
where no COVID-19 income supports were available and individuals did not receive 
other forms of income support from the Department of Social Protection. In the 
absence of COVID-19 income supports, median weekly earnings would have fallen 
by 15 per cent in the year to Q2 2020 and this compares to a drop of only 6.5 per 
cent when the COVID-19 income supports are taken into account. While this does 
illustrate the positive role that the COVID-19 income supports have played, it does 




11  CSO (2020). Impact of Selected COVID-19 Income Supports on Employees – Insights from Real Time Administrative 
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and Jobseeker’s Assistance, although less generous in some circumstances, would 
have played a similar role.  
 
Table 3 displays the monthly cost to the Exchequer of pandemic-related 
unemployment and of the accompanying supports in terms of income tax 
foregone, extra welfare payments (including the PUP) and the EWSS. In the 
absence of the PUP or the EWSS the monthly net Exchequer cost of the pandemic 
labour market shock is estimated to be €144 million per 100,000 displaced 
workers. With the PUP and EWSS in operation this is estimated to increase by 
€49 million to €193 million per 100,000 displaced workers. This shows that most of 
the cost of the current suite of policies would have been incurred in their absence. 
This is because the existing tax-benefit system would have helped stabilise incomes 
through increased Jobseeker’s Benefit or Assistance payments for example. The 
EWSS also results in higher income tax if employers who receive the subsidy pay 
employees their pre-pandemic wage. 
 
TABLE 3  THE COST OF COVID-19 RELATED UNEMPLOYMENT IN TERMS OF DIRECT TAX AND 
WELFARE 
 Cost per month for 100k displaced workers (€ million) 
 COVID – no policy 
response* 
COVID – with policy 
response** 
Change in earnings -215 -155 
(a) Change in tax/SIC revenue -72 -54 
(b) Change in welfare expenditure 72 69 
  Pandemic Unemployment Payment 0 61 
(c) Employment Wage subsidy scheme 0 70 
Net Exchequer impact (a-b-c) -144 -193 
 
Source:  SWITCH v3.1 2021 direct tax and welfare policies applied to 2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions data, uprated to 2021 
income levels.  
Notes:  *Assumes 50 per cent of jobs supported by the EWSS would have been lost in the absence of this policy.  
 **Assumes employers who avail of the EWSS pay employees their pre-pandemic wage.  
 SIC stands for social insurance contributions. 
 
The average monthly unemployment rate for 2020 was 18.7 per cent. We estimate 
that the unemployment rate in Q4 of 2021 will be approximately 10 per cent with 
the average unemployment rate for 2021 overall being 16.7 per cent. We believe 
it is unlikely that the unemployment rate will approach its pre-COVID low of 4.7 per 
cent until 2023 at the earliest. We forecast that unemployment will average 7.3 per 
cent for 2022 as we expect growth in consumption, exports and investment to 
drive an improvement in the labour market.  
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PUBLIC FINANCES 
Key Points  
• Given the scale of the Level 5 lockdown, a significant deficit is expected in 2021.  
• A deficit is likely again in 2022.  
• An alternative measure of debt sustainability suggests more scope for fiscal 
policy.  
 
Figure 24 plots the growth rates for the main taxation items for 2020.  
 
FIGURE 24 ANNUAL CHANGES IN MAJOR TAX SUB-COMPONENTS 2020 (%) 
 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
While overall taxation receipts declined by just over 3.6 per cent, this must be seen 
as a relatively benign impact on the public finances given the severity of the 
economic shock in 2020. Income taxation receipts were only down by 1 per cent 
for the year confirming the trend noted in Commentaries in 2020 which highlighted 
the disproportionate impact of the economic shock on the lower paid in the 
economy. Corporation tax receipts continued the trend of recent years with an 
annual increase of 8.7 per cent. Of the taxation items most impacted, VAT 
witnessed an annual decline of almost 18 per cent while Customs saw a fall of 












2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Excise Duty Income Tax Corporation Tax Valued Added Tax Total
36  |  Q ua rt er ly  Eco no m ic  C omme nt ary  –  S p r i ng  20 21   
 
While income tax receipts were only down 1 per cent, total PRSI receipts fell by 
8.3 per cent in 2020. The rate of decline is greater than the fall in income tax 
receipts as PRSI is less progressive and captures more of the impact of the job 
losses during the course of the year. 
 
For 2020, the increased expenditure in areas such as social protection, along with 
the overall decline in taxation revenues, resulted in a General Government Balance 
deficit of €19.7 billion or 5.4 per cent of GDP. In 2021, under our scenario that there 
is a Level 5 lockdown in Q1 2021 with a vaccine being rolled out to the general 
public in the latter half of the year, we expect most tax headings to register 
significant growth as can be seen from Table 4. We have a relatively conservative 
forecast for corporation taxes of zero growth in the present year. This reflects the 
ongoing concern as to the sustainability of recent increases in this category. 
 
We assume that the Government will continue to provide the income support 
schemes for the duration of the year. This will require increased levels of 
Government expenditure again in 2021. Overall, in 2021, we forecast the deficit 
will be €18.5 billion in 2021 or 4.7 per cent of GDP. 
 
TABLE 4 FORECAST OF KEY TAXATION AGGREGATES IN 2021 (%) 
Tax 2020 actual growth (%) 2021 forecast growth (%) 
Income -1.0 4.0 
VAT -17.8 25.0 
Corporation 8.7 0.0 
Excise -8.3 15.0 
Total -3.6 8.8 
 
Sources:  Department of Finance and QEC. 
 
Figure 25 plots the forecast General Government Balance for both 2020 and 2021 
for a select set of European countries. Notwithstanding the fact that Ireland had 
arguably one of the most restrictive set of public health lockdowns across Europe, 
our general balance is set to be one of the smallest for both years. 
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FIGURE 25 FORECAST GENERAL GOVERNMENT BALANCE (% OF GDP) FOR SELECT EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES 2020 AND 2021 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat. 
 
From a sovereign funding perspective, the National Treasury Management Agency 
(NTMA) has large cash balances and does not have any bonds maturing in 2021. 
The Agency expects that the ECB’s Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme 
(PEPP) along with its pre-COVID Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) will 
continue to underpin the Irish bond market. 
 
We summarise the resulting implications for our forecasts of the debt-to-output 
ratios in Figure 26. At the end of 2020, the debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 61 per cent 
while debt-to-GNI* increased to almost 104 per cent. In 2019, the debt-to-GNI* 
ratio had fallen to 95 per cent. In 2021 both ratios will increase to 61.3 and 
104.2 per cent respectively;  however in 2022, we believe the pace of recovery in 
the domestic economy will cause those ratios to decline marginally to 59.4 per cent 
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FIGURE 26 DEBT-TO-GDP AND DEBT-TO-GNI*RATIOS (%) 
 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
In the previous Commentary, a Box by Allen-Coghlan and McQuinn examined the 
potential sustainability of this debt under plausible future growth scenarios for the 
economy. That analysis used the standard debt-to-GDP metric in terms of assessing 
future sustainability issues. In a follow-up Box, Allen-Coghlan and McQuinn assess 
fiscal sustainability with a different approach, in particular the ratio of real debt 






12  Furman, J. and L. Summers (2020). ‘A Reconsideration of Fiscal Policy in the Era of Low Interest Rates’ Brookings 
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BOX B AN ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF DEBT SUSTAINABILITY 
A Box in the Winter Commentary explored the issue of Irish debt sustainability in the 
context of the significant deficit run by the Irish government in 2020 in response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Utilising a range of output growth and interest rate scenarios it was 
shown that even in a situation where growth was below baseline due to the lasting impact 
of the pandemic, general government debt was sustainable over the medium term in a low 
interest rate environment. In that analysis the standard debt-to-GDP ratio was used as a 
gauge for the sustainability of Irish debt levels. This metric is commonly used in the debt 
sustainability literature with a higher value of the ratio (relative to its historical value 
and/or that of other countries) indicating a greater risk of default. As well as this, the debt-
to-GDP ratio is also a central component of the fiscal rules of the European Union’s Stability 
and Growth pact where a 60 per cent debt/GDP threshold is imposed on Member States.  
 
However, in light of the persistent low interest rates in the Euro Area over the last decade, 
the relevance of the debt-to-GDP ratio has been called into question. The accommodative 
monetary policy of the ECB has driven debt service costs of ECB Member States to record 
low levels. This means that the debt burden for any given value of the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
less now than it was in the past. For example, the debt-to-GDP ratio for Ireland is estimated 
to be 61.8 per cent in 2021. In 2009 the debt-to-GDP ratio was at a comparable level of 
61.5 per cent. However, while yields on ten-year Irish government bonds averaged around 
0 per cent in 2021, in 2009 the same bond yields averaged around 5 per cent. Therefore 
the Irish government has much greater ability to service its debt in 2021 than in 2009, a 
result which would not be evident from comparing the debt-to-GDP ratios between the 
two periods. The Irish State also lost access to sovereign debt markets in 2010 due to the 
scale of the global financial crisis. Results such as this cast doubt on the validity of using 
the debt-to-GDP ratio as a measure of debt sustainability, as well as the rigidity of rules 
that use this metric such as the 60 per cent limit in the Stability and Growth Pact. 
 
An alternative metric proposed by Furman and Summers (2020) is the real interest 
payments-to-GDP ratio. This measure of debt sustainability has the advantage over 
debt-to-GDP in that it explicitly takes into account debt service payments and so measures 





(𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 −  𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡) ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
      (1) 
Where 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 is the real interest rate in period t, 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the nominal interest rate, 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 is the 
inflation rate, 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 is the gross national debt at the end of the prior period and 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡  is 
the nominal gross domestic product.  
 
The nominal interest rate is the average interest rate to the Exchequer in a given year. As 
most of the stock of the debt is issued at a fixed rate, an interest rate shock would only 
apply to a relatively small proportion of the debt. As per Furman and Summers (2020) the 
inflation rate is taken as the five-year moving average to give a measure closer to the 
concept of expected inflation. The real interest rate is simply the nominal interest minus 
the rate of inflation. As can be seen in Figure A both the nominal and real interest rate in 
Ireland have been in decline since 2013.  
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FIGURE A NOMINAL AND REAL AVERAGE INTEREST RATE 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
In order to estimate Equation (1) for 2020 and 2021 we use GDP forecasts from the latest 
QEC, gross debt and interest payment forecasts from Budget 2021 and inflation forecasts 
from the European Commission (averaged over five years). The real interest rates as a 
share of GDP as well as the debt-to-GDP ratio are presented in Figure B. 
 
FIGURE B REAL INTEREST PAYMENTS AND DEBT-TO-GDP 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
Pre-2019 both debt/GDP and real interest payments/GDP moved in a similar manner. After 
the financial crisis the proportion of Irish debt as a percentage of GDP increased rapidly as 
did the interest payments on that debt. Both of these metrics then started to decline 
significantly after 2013 as the economy began to recover after the recession. However, in 
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debt-to-GDP ratio has increased as a result of the expected large deficits being run by the 
government in these years, the real interest payments as a share of GDP continue to 
decline with the ratio expected to decline to its lowest rate since 2008 in 2021. This is as a 
result of the declining real interest rates on Irish debt in 2020 which are expected to 
continue into 2021.  
 
While a hard rule has not yet been proposed around the real interest payments-to-GDP 
measure, it would appear that, based on this approach, the Irish government would have 
more scope to continue an expansionary fiscal policy than a rule based on the debt-to-GDP 
ratio. Indeed, given the accommodative monetary policy that has been run by the ECB for 
the last number of years and the limited scope for further expansionary monetary policy, 
fiscal expansion may not only be feasible but may be warranted in an environment where 
economic growth is below potential.  
 
However, the scope for such fiscal expansion is conditional on low interest rates being 
maintained going forward. Given that the ECB adjusts its monetary policy based on 
inflation with a target of 2 per cent, the most likely trigger of an increase in interest rates 
would be an increase in prices across the Eurozone. At the present time inflation remains 
subdued despite the unprecedented monetary stimulus. Were prices to start increasing 
and the ECB to roll back some of its accommodative monetary policy13 then we would likely 
start to see an increase in the interest rates on Irish government debt, increasing debt 
financing costs which in turn would limit the scope for fiscal stimulus. 
 
References 
Furman, J. and L. Summers (2020). ‘A Reconsideration of Fiscal Policy in the Era of Low 
Interest Rates’. Brookings Institute, Discussion Draft. 
 







13  The ECB is bound by ‘the issuer limit’ which refers to the maximum share of an issuer’s outstanding securities that 
the ECB is prepared to buy. The issuer limit of 33 per cent is a means to safeguard market functioning and price 
formation as well as to mitigate the risk of the ECB becoming a dominant creditor of Euro Area governments. 
14  Note Matthew Allen-Coghlan was an employee of the ESRI when this Box was written. 





The sharp rise in COVID-19 infections through late Q4 2020 prompted the Irish 
authorities to re-impose a Level 5 series of restrictions from 30 December 2020 to 
5 April 2021 at the earliest. Compared to the measures that were introduced in 
September 2020, the latest measures are quite restrictive with all schools closed 
and most construction,15 for example, now included in the general shut down.  
 
The significant tightness of the restrictions, along with the relatively long length of 
their duration, will have an adverse impact on the economic recovery which had 
been apparent throughout the latter part of 2020. The most obvious manifestation 
of this is in the labour market where the unemployment rate which had declined 
to less than 17 per cent in Q3 2020, is now likely to average over 25 per cent in 
Q1 2021. 
 
The Winter 2020 Commentary had envisaged a further series of Level 5 restrictions 
for six weeks in the first half of 2021 in response to the easing of the measures 
prior to Christmas 2020. As the current restrictions exceeded our previous 
expectation, we are now revising downwards our growth expectations for the Irish 
economy in 2021. We still believe the economy will register positive growth of 
4.4 per cent in the present year. The expected path for unemployment in 2021 is 
also revised upward, albeit marginally. We now expect the unemployment rate to 
peak in Q1 2021 before falling gradually thereafter. By the end of the year the rate 
is expected to be just above 10 per cent. All of this assumes that the vaccination 
programme will facilitate the broad relaxation of public health restrictions in the 
second half of 2021 and that there will not be another Level 5 lockdown this year. 
 
Our first set of forecasts for 2022 reflect our belief that the Irish economy is well 
positioned to recover strongly once the threat from COVID-19 recedes significantly. 
As noted in the Output section, the Irish economy alone amongst European 
countries experienced an actual positive growth rate in 2020, while the typical 
contraction for most economies was somewhere in the region of 6 per cent. We 
believe the Irish economy will grow by 5.2 per cent in 2022 with unemployment 
falling back to an average of 7.3 per cent for the year. Based on our forecasts, we 
believe it is unlikely that the unemployment rate will approach its pre-COVID low 




15  Certain types of construction were exempt from the restrictions. These included certain social housing projects and 
other projects deemed to be essential from a health and education perspective as well as the repair, maintenance and 
construction of critical transport and utility infrastructure.  
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A notable feature of the impact of COVID-19 in Ireland has been a very dramatic 
increase in household savings. With fewer opportunities to undertake expenditure 
due to public health measures, households have on average been accumulating 
savings deposits to a greater extent in Ireland than in other European countries. 
These savings are a potential source of stimulus for the economy when the public 
health phase of this crisis eases. If households run down these excess savings, we 
expect consumption to increase. There are a number of uncertainties relating to 
the extent to which these savings may translate into expenditure which we have 
noted. In the present Commentary, we assume that widescale vaccination will 
occur by the second half of 2021 and households will begin to run down these 
savings. This stimulus is likely to continue into 2022.  
 
The nature of the Level 5 restrictions introduced in early 2021 means that the fiscal 
accounts are likely to be in a more adverse state for the present year than was 
previously thought. This is because more people are likely to be unemployed for a 
longer period than was originally forecast. Consequently, we now believe that a 
deficit of 4.7 per cent or €18.5 billion is likely for the present year. That will result 
in the debt-to-GDP ratio increasing from 58.8 per cent in 2019 to just over 61 per 
cent by the end of 2021.  
 
This increase in the debt levels has inevitably given rise to questions as to whether 
a contractionary fiscal policy will be required to pay for the additional costs of 
COVID-19 to the Exchequer. While it is still too early to conclusively answer this, a 
Box in the public finances section by Allen-Coghlan and McQuinn examines an 
alternative measure of debt sustainability which has recently been suggested in 
the literature. The ratio of real interest payments to GDP proposed by Furman and 
Summers (2020)16 is a measure of debt sustainability. Its main advantage over the 
traditional debt-to-GDP ratio is that it explicitly takes into account debt service 
payments and so measures the affordability of debt to the State in any given 
period. The application in an Irish context in the Box suggests that the Irish 
government would have more fiscal policy flexibility than if debt sustainability 
were measured with the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
 
More generally, at a European level there is set to be considerable debate about 
the future conduct of fiscal policy over the coming months; the EU Commission is 




16  Furman, J. and L. Summers (2020). ‘A Reconsideration of Fiscal Policy in the Era of Low Interest Rates’ Brookings 
Institute, Discussion Draft. 
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elections. Recent comments by Schnabel (2021)17 are interesting in that regard. 
Schnabel (2021) calls for unconventional fiscal policies which support the efforts of 
the European Central Bank (ECB) when inflation is below its target level. She points 
out that in a European context, increased public investment, for example, has been 
found to ‘crowd in’ as opposed to ‘crowd out’ private investment.  
 
The new European fiscal framework needs to be framed in such a manner which, 
while ensuring a return to fiscal discipline amongst Member States in the medium 
term, facilitates increased levels of government investment in key physical and 
social infrastructure over the same period. Fiscal rules could be formulated which 
allow for Member State governments to engage in greater capital investment in 
areas such as social and affordable housing and green technologies on an ongoing 
basis, but which also ensure that, after the pandemic, current expenditure is 
maintained at a sustainable level. In considering the response of European fiscal 
policy, it is worth keeping in mind the scale and scope of the Biden fiscal stimulus 
outlined recently in the United States. 
 
In terms of the debt-to-GDP ratio, another key issue in an Irish context is which 
output indicator to use in order to accurately capture the level of domestic 
economic activity and the economic welfare of those living in Ireland. In a Box in 
the Commentary, FitzGerald follows up a previous paper proposing a new output 
variable for this purpose; Net National Product (NNP). By moving to NNP, both 
depreciation of MNEs and non-MNEs is deducted from the overall output level. 
Detailed data derived from the CSO Institutional Sector Accounts for the individual 
industrial sectors are then used to add back in the subsequent statistical 
discrepancy in the National Accounts. FitzGerald estimates, based on the latest 
data for the institutional sectors, that economic welfare (NNP) in the Irish economy 
grew on average by 5 per cent per annum over the period 2013 to 2019. While this 
is somewhat below the average GDP rate for the period (8.6 per cent), it still 
demonstrates the extent to which the Irish economy had recovered from the global 
financial crisis (GFC). 
 
A Research Note to the Commentary by McQuinn re-examines the relationship 
between house prices and mortgage credit. The Note updates earlier analysis by 
Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2007),18 which concluded that a mutually reinforcing 
relationship existed between house prices and mortgage credit in an Irish context. 




17  Schnabel I. (2021). ‘Unconventional fiscal and monetary policy at the zero lower bound’, Keynote speech by Isabel 
Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Third Annual Conference organised by the European Fiscal 
Board on ‘High Debt, Low Rates and Tail Events: Rules-Based Fiscal Frameworks under Stress’. 
18  Fitzpatrick T. and K. McQuinn (2007). ‘House prices and mortgage credit: Empirical evidence for Ireland’, The 
Manchester School, Vol. 75, Number 1, pp.82-103. 
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  S pr in g  202 1  |  45  
 
preceding 2007. In updating the analysis, McQuinn concludes that the relationship 
still holds. Furthermore, the analysis also demonstrates that the average mortgage 
loan issued is approximately 8 per cent below the level suggested by the model. 
This would suggest that the macroprudential policy regime introduced by the 
Central Bank of Ireland in 2015 is limiting the increase in the average loan amount 
to be below that which it otherwise would be. Of course, by restricting the increase 
in the average loan amount the regulations are then, in turn, restricting the 
increase in house prices. 
 
Of considerable importance for the provision of credit to the Irish economy, is the 
long-run structure and composition of the banking sector in Ireland. The recent 
announcement from Ulster Bank that it is to exit from the provision of banking 
services in Ireland is a blow to the competitive set up of the industry. Ireland’s 
banking sector is concentrated, and with the loss of Ulster Bank, further 
competitive dynamics may be eroded. A competitive banking system can help an 
economy through the provision of sufficient financing at a competitive price for 
business and households. Policies to facilitate competition in the sector should be 
explored.  
 
In a recent economic commentary19 the IMF has pointed to a notable feature of 
the international COVID-19 crisis, which has been a marked reduction in corporate 
insolvencies internationally. This dynamic has also been found in Ireland. The 
extraordinary policy supports and expenditure mitigation measures (such as 
payment breaks) that have been extended to enterprises have undoubtedly 
allowed many affected firms to weather the COVID-19 economic storm. The extent 
to which severely affected firms and industries can recover will depend on many 
factors but it is likely some economic adjustments will occur and present survival 





19  IMF (2021). World Economic Outlook Update January 2021. Available at: World Economic Outlook Update, January 
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HOUSE PRICES AND MORTGAGE CREDIT: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR 




In this Note, the results of an earlier paper by Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2007), 
which estimates a long-run mutually reinforcing relationship between credit and 
house prices in the Irish market, are updated. The Note finds that most of the 
results of the earlier paper, which were estimated over the period 1981 to 1999, 
also hold when estimated over the longer time period 1981 to 2020. This is 
somewhat surprising as the period 2000 to 2020 witnessed significant changes in 
the Irish housing and credit markets. The results also indicate that, post-2018, the 
actual average mortgage loan amount is somewhat below the value suggested by 
the model. This may be due to the adoption of a suite of macroprudential policies 
by the Central Bank of Ireland in 2015. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2007) (henceforth FM) provide an important 
characterisation of the relationship between house prices and mortgage credit in 
the Irish residential property market. The paper builds on earlier work by McQuinn 
(2004), which specified a model of Irish house prices. However, the FM model 
added a credit channel to the housing model and, in particular, examined the 
possibility of a mutually reinforcing relationship between house prices and 
mortgage credit. The establishment and quantification of such a relationship was 
particularly telling, given the subsequent difficulties which arose in the Irish 
property and banking sectors, with the emergence of a credit-fuelled bubble 
post-2003. The emergence of this bubble resulted in Irish credit institutions being 
particularly vulnerable to the international financial crisis of 2007/2008. Indeed, 
the difficulties in the Irish banking sector were the main reason for the Irish 
Government entering into a programme of support with the European Union (EU), 
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
(commonly referred to as the ‘Troika’) in October 2010.2 
 
The FM model was estimated over the time period 1980 to 1999. Given the 




1  The author is an economist at the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). The author is solely responsible for 
the views expressed in the paper. 
2  See Honohan (2010) for more on this.  
* kieran.mcquinn@esri.ie  
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to examine how the main results of the model stand up over the longer period 
1981 to 2020. Furthermore, can the model yield any insights into the relationship 
between house prices and mortgage credit in the Irish market today? This is 
particularly appropriate given the introduction of macroprudential rules by the 
Central Bank of Ireland in February 2015. These regulations place ceilings on the 
proportion of mortgage lending at high LTVs and LTIs by domestic financial 
institutions. The objective of these measures is to increase the resilience of the 
banking and household sectors to the property market and to try and reduce the 
risk of bank credit and housing price ‘spirals’ from emerging in future.3  
2. MODEL 
The FM model can be summarised as follows: 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 ,𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡,𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡)             (1) 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 , 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 ,𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡)                (2) 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ,𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡⁄ ,𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡)             (3) 
𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 = (1 −  𝜎𝜎)𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡           (4) 
where (1) is an inverted housing demand expression augmented to include a credit 
channel with house prices 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 being a function of disposable income per capita 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 , 
demographics 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,  the average loan amount 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡  and the housing stock 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡. The 
average loan amount (2) is assumed to be a function of income per capita, house 
prices and the real interest rate 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 . A housing supply function (3) is also included 
which specifies that actual completions 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 are a function of house prices, house 
prices deflated by builders’ costs 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 and land costs 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. The system is completed by 
a perpetual inventory expression (4) for the housing stock. 
 
In the original application, several different estimators were used to deal with the 
endogeneity issue associated with the credit and house price variables.4 In 
particular the Stock and Watson (1993) dynamic ordinary least squares or DOLS 
approach, which explicitly allows for potential correlation between the 
explanatory variables and the error process and the Philips-Hansen (1990) fully 
modified ordinary least squares FM-OLS, which allows for statistical inference 
within multivariate regressions where the regressors have I(1) processes. 
The results of these two estimators are then compared with what Hyashi (2000) 




3  In particular, for non-first-time buyers purchasing a primary dwelling, a limit of 80 per cent LTV will now exist, while 
lending for primary dwelling purchases above 3.5 times LTI is now restricted to no more than 20 per cent of that 
aggregate value. The regulations are somewhat more lenient for first-time buyers.  
4  In the present exercise, the same data sources are used as the original model. 
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endogeneity, no inference on the basis of t-stats is possible with the latter 
estimator. 
3. RESULTS 
Figure 1 plots some of the main data used in the analysis. 
 
FIGURE 1 SELECT IRISH HOUSING AND MACROECONOMIC DATA: 1995-2020 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note:  The average loan size, disposable income and house prices are in index form (1995Q1 = 100). Interest rates are in percentages 
and can be read on the right-hand axis. 
 
The data are plotted from 1995 to 2020. From both the loan and house price data, 
the remarkable increase in the period 1995 to 2007 is clearly apparent with the 
subsequent decline between 2008 and 2013 equally obvious. It is clear that both 
house prices and average mortgage credit have grown persistently in the period 
since 2013. What is also evident from the data is, notwithstanding the period after 
the 2007/2008 crisis, the remarkable improvement in macroeconomic variables 
over the 1995 to 2020 period. The consistent lowering of mortgage interest rates 
coupled with the strong growth in income has ultimately fuelled the sustained 
increase in housing demand over the period. 
 
Table 1 compares the results of the three estimators for Equations (1) and (2) 



















1995Q1 1997Q3 2000Q1 2002Q3 2005Q1 2007Q3 2010Q1 2012Q3 2015Q1 2017Q3 2020Q1
Average Loan Disposable income per capita House prices Interest rates (RHS)
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TABLE 1 LONG-RUN SINGLE EQUATION FOR HOUSE PRICES AND MORTGAGE CREDIT 1981 TO 
1999 AND 1981 TO 2020  
 1981-1999 (N=80) 
D. Variable House Prices (P) Credit (C) 
 DOLS SOLS FM-OLS DOLS SOLS FM-OLS 
𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕 0.914 0.745 0.838 1.04 1.02 1.05 
 (5.911)  (4.618) (2.924)  (6.323) 
𝒓𝒓𝒕𝒕    0.007 0.009 0.009 
    (1.771)  (4.025) 
𝑪𝑪𝒕𝒕 1.327 1.328 1.315    
 (13.954)  (11.416)    
𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕    0.514 0.519 0.497 
    (2.656)  (4.710) 
𝑯𝑯𝒕𝒕 -1.245 -1.219 -1.209    
 (-14.071)  (-12.332)    
𝑫𝑫𝒕𝒕 2.011 2.188 2.229    
 (6.628)  (6.125)    
 
 1981-2020 (N=162) 
D. Variable House Prices (P) Credit (C) 
 DOLS SOLS FM-OLS DOLS SOLS FM-OLS 
𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕 0.339 0.269 0.226 1.423 1.364 1.412 
 (1.593)  (2.454) (5.521)  (14.765) 
𝒓𝒓𝒕𝒕    0.005 0.002 0.003 
    (0.593)  (1.162) 
𝑪𝑪𝒕𝒕 1.068 1.164 1.167    
 (5.722)  (21.077)    
𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕    0.474 0.488 0.468 
    (2.727)  (7.195) 
𝑯𝑯𝒕𝒕 -2.988 -2.857 -3.026    
 (-5.556)  (-13.648)    
𝑫𝑫𝒕𝒕 1.648 1.208 1.431    
 (4.240)  (7.012)    
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note:  T-statistics are in parenthesis. All variables except the real mortgage rate are in logs. 
 
For the 1981 to 2020 time period, focussing on the results for the house prices in 
the credit regression and for the credit variable in the house price regression, there 
is a degree of consistency in terms of the scale of the parameter estimates across 
the different estimators. This mimics the results for the original time period. For 
the credit variable, the coefficient is between 1.07 and 1.17, while for the house 
price variable in the credit equation, the coefficient is between 0.47 and 0.49. 
 
The results also suggest that house prices and credit have similar impacts in the 
respective equations across the two time periods. In terms of the price variable in 
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the credit equation, this is almost the same as the coefficient for the earlier period 
(0.50 to 0.52). For the 1981 to 1999 time period, the credit variable in the house 
price regression has a coefficient range between 1.32 and 1.33. In both cases, the 
differences in the coefficient values across the two time periods are not significant. 
 
Among the variables, the income variable both in the house price and the credit 
regression does have a significantly different size between the two periods. It is 
somewhat smaller in the subsequent period for the house price regression and 
somewhat bigger in the credit regression. This underpins the importance of income 
levels in determining the average mortgage amount since 2000. As income levels 
are more important in determining credit levels, they remain an important 
determinant of house prices. 
 
We now examine the actual and fitted values from (1) and (2) in Figures 2a and 2b.  
 
FIGURE 2A RESULTS FROM LONG-RUN HOUSE PRICE MODEL (LOGS): 2010-2020 
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FIGURE 2B RESULTS FROM LONG-RUN CREDIT MODEL (LOGS): 2010-2020 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
The results for the house price model show that house prices have broadly moved 
in line with what (1) would suggest. For the period 2011 to 2013, actual house price 
falls exceed those predicted by the model. This is not surprising as the scale of the 
housing market decline at that stage may have resulted, for example, in a total 
decline in confidence amongst perspective residential investors. This would cause 
prices to fall by more than what the model suggests. This could also be the reason 
why the average loan amount model did not appear to fall by as much as what the 
decline in house prices, in particular, would suggest for the same period.  
 
However, there is also a divergence between the actual loan amount and the level 
suggested by the model for the end of the period. From the start of 2018, the 
model suggests that the average loan amount should be continuing to increase, 
whereas the actual amount has remained static. On average the actual loan 
amount is over 8 per cent below the level suggested by the model over the 
2018/2020 period. The most obvious reason for this divergence is the introduction 
in 2015 by the Central Bank of Ireland of a suite of macroprudential measures 
which limit the amount of mortgage lending at high LTVs and LTIs by domestic 
financial institutions. It may well be the case that the regulations are limiting the 
increase in the average loan amount to be below that which it otherwise would be. 
Of course, by restricting the increase in the average loan amount the regulations 
are then, in turn, restricting the increase in house prices. The results in Table 1 
would suggest, for example, that a 1 per cent increase in the average amount 
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4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
An update of the Fitzpatrick McQuinn (2007) model of house prices and mortgage 
credit in the Irish market indicates that the key coefficients estimated in the model 
have remained relatively stable when estimated over a longer time period (1981 
to 2020). This is somewhat surprising as the interim period (post-2000) has 
witnessed one of the largest house price / mortgage credit spirals observed 
amongst OECD countries.  
 
The results reiterate the notion of a mutually reinforcing relationship between 
mortgage credit and house prices in the Irish market. This relationship is 
underscored by a simulation of the model, which reveals that the average loan 
amount suggested by the model post-2018 is somewhat higher than the actual 
loan amount. This suggests that the recent macroprudential policy framework 
introduced by the Central Bank of Ireland is restricting the average loan amount to 
be less than what it would be if the regulations were not in place. 
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